1.State Key Laboratory of Control and Simulation of Power System and Generation Equipments, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;2.Guangdong Power Exchange Center Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510030, China
In view of the difficulty in solving the fixed cost recovery problem of generating units in the energy-only market, the overseas power markets have launched the practice of establishing capacity markets, forming price signals for unit compensation with a market-based mechanism to ensure the sufficiency of generating capacity. From the perspective of capacity market mechanism design, this paper conducts modeling and equilibrium analysis of the power capacity market with investment decision on the premise of considering the strategic behavior of market members. Firstly, the basic mechanism of capacity markets is described, and a two-layer equilibrium model is established for the investment decision problem of capacity markets. The upper model is the optimal decision model of the oligarch and the lower model is the capacity market clearing model. Secondly, the two-layer model is transformed into a single-layer model by using the optimality condition. While the model is linearized by piecewise linearization, the mixed-integer linear programming problem is obtained. Finally, based on the actual data of one province in China, this paper makes a case study of the strategic behavior of market players, reveals the excessive investment behavior and its influencing factors of the oligarch during bidding period, proposes a strategic behavior regulation method based on limiting the freedom of project bidding, and verifies the effectiveness of this method.
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. U1966204).
|||ZHANG Yan, CHEN Qixin, GUO Hongye, et al. Equilibrium Analysis of Power Capacity Market Incorporating Investment Decision[J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(20):11-18. DOI:10.7500/AEPS20200515004|