文章摘要
李媛,冯昌森,文福拴,等.含电动汽车和电转气的园区能源互联网能源定价与管理[J].电力系统自动化,2018,42(16):1-10. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20180214003.
LI Yuan,FENG Changsen,WEN Fushuan, et al.Energy Pricing and Management for Park-level Energy Internets with Electric Vehicles and Power-to-gas Devices[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2018,42(16):1-10. DOI: 10.7500/AEPS20180214003.
含电动汽车和电转气的园区能源互联网能源定价与管理
Energy Pricing and Management for Park-level Energy Internets with Electric Vehicles and Power-to-gas Devices
DOI:10.7500/AEPS20180214003
关键词: 园区能源互联网  能源定价  能量管理  主从博弈  电动汽车向电网反向送电(V2G)  电转气(P2G)
KeyWords: park-level Energy Internet(PEI)  energy pricing  energy management  Stackelberg game  vehicle to grid(V2G)  power to gas(P2G)
上网日期:2018-07-05
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(51477151)
作者单位E-mail
李媛 浙江大学电气工程学院, 浙江省杭州市 310027  
冯昌森 浙江大学电气工程学院, 浙江省杭州市 310027  
文福拴 浙江大学电气工程学院, 浙江省杭州市 310027 fushuan.wen@gmail.com 
王珂 广州供电局有限公司, 广东省广州市 510620  
黄裕春 广州供电局有限公司, 广东省广州市 510620  
摘要:
      能源互联网的发展有助于实现多能系统间的互补、协调和优化,获得经济与环境效益。而电动汽车向电网反向送电(V2G)和电转气(P2G)技术的不断发展,对能源互联网中多类型能源的能量管理提出了新的要求。在此背景下,以含电动汽车和P2G设备的园区能源互联网为研究对象,首先提出包含能源供应商、园区运营商和用户代理的互动框架。接着,建立了园区运营商和用户代理理性追求自身利益最大化的主从博弈模型。其中,园区运营商(领导者)确定从能源供应商处的购能策略、所拥有设备的运行状态,并制定向/从用户代理出售/购买的多种能源价格,而用户代理(追随者)则根据动态能源价格信号调整用户用能策略。之后,应用KKT(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker)条件、对偶定理和线性松弛技术,将主从博弈模型转化为混合整数线性规划问题,并利用商业化求解器YALMIP/GUROBI求解。最后,以某工业园区为例对所提出的模型和方法进行说明,并着重分析V2G和P2G技术在提高系统运行的整体经济性、消纳风电能力等方面的效果。
Abstract:
      Significant benefits in economics and environment could be attained from the development of Energy Internets, with the objectives of implementing complementarity, coordination and optimization among multi-energy systems. Recent developments in some key technologies, such as vehicle to grid(V2G)and power to gas(P2G), impose new requirements for the energy management of multiple kinds of energy in an energy internet. Given this background, a park-level Energy Internet(PEI)with integrated electric vehicles(EVs)and P2G devices is addressed. First, an interactive framework of the PEI is proposed, including the energy suppliers, park operator and user agent. A Stackelberg game model is then established, in which the park operator and user agent rationally seek optimal strategies to maximize their own benefits. The park operator(the leader)determines the optimal energy procurement portfolio from the energy suppliers, the optimal operation strategy of owned devices and sets prices for various kinds of energy for the user agent while the user agent(the follower)adjusts the energy consumption profile with respect to dynamic energy price signals. Next, the Stackelberg game model is transformed into a mixed integer linear programming problem through jointly employing the KKT(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker)optimality condition, the duality theory and the relaxation technology, and then solved with the well-developed YALMIP/GUROBI commercial solver. Finally, a sample industrial park is employed to demonstrate the presented model and solution method. The performances of V2G and P2G in promoting the overall economic benefits, as well as enhancing the capability of accommodating wind power, are also analyzed.
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